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THE GREEKS AT PLATAIAI.
FOR the future any discussion of the problems connected with the Battle
of Plataiai must take into account Mr. Grundy's careful survey of the field.
In the map that accompanies his monograph we have at fast reached finality.1
The satisfaction of this supreme requirement is his best contribution to the
subject. His application of strategical principles to the narrative of
Herodotos2 is only partial; and his result is not clear, because he has tried
to realize the apocryphal portions of the ancient account. It is only
after stripping off the husk of romantic accretion that we can proceed to
examine the details by the light of military principles. It is such
preliminary work and such subsequent recasting of the narrative that is
here attempted.3
Mr. Grundy hits the truth when he suggests that Herodotos obtained
his information about the operations from an intelligent, but not highly
placed, officer. Further, Herodotos himself was not primarily a military
historian. His narrative therefore treats merely subordinate and inter-
mediate steps as final ends; and while events are thus viewed only from the
outside their presentation is moulded by the epic cast of the writer's genius.
Of perhaps still greater moment is his strong Athenian bias. In the
recognition of these three factors,—the epic character of the narrative,
ignorance of the true strategical issues of the situation on the part of his
informant, and the contamination produced by the sympathy of Herodotos
with, or his sole reliance upon, the Athenian tradition,—we hold the key to
the entire account of the campaign of 479 B.C. Some of the details may
have been derived from Thersander of Orchomenos, e.g. the Phokian episode.4
It is also possible that Herodotos incorporated in his history local stories
of the battle. Specimens of these may perhaps be seen in the description of
the charger of Masistios,6 and of the spoil taken from the Persian camp : 6
the three stories which represent the Aiginetans in so poor a light7 were
1
 See the Battle of Plataea, by G. B. Grundy ; 4 ix. 16 fol.
published among the Supplementary Papers of 6 ix. 20.
the Eoyal Geographical Society, 1894. 6 ix. 80 fol. ef. c. 83.
2
 Op. cit. pp. 43 fol. > ix. 78 fol., Lampon of Aigina urges Paus-
3
 I find from Holm's Ork. Hist. ii. 75 (E.T.) anias to maltreat the body of Mardonios : c. 80,
that Delbriick ' explains the movements of both Aiginetans buy golden spoil from Helots on pre-
armies on the basis of correct military principles.' tence that it is brass : c. 85, pretended tomb of
I have not seen Delbmck's book. Aiginetans at Plataiai.
B.S.—VOL. XVIII. I>
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perhaps also current at Plataiai. The contents of chaps. 71, 72, 76 probably
come from a purely Spartan source.1 Not one of these supplements to the
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Attic core of the narrative has any bearing upon the operations preceding
the battle.
1
 Relating the fate of Amompharetos, Aristodemos, Kallikrates, etc. and the rescue of the
concubine of Pharandates*.
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The operations of the campaign resolve themselves into three strategic
movements:—
(1) The occupation of the lines on the slope of Mount Kithairon
(cc. 19-24).
(2) The advance to the Spring Gargaphia and the River Asopos
(cc. 25-49).
(3) The retrograde movement to the ' Island' (cc. 50-70).
The key to these manoeuvres lies in the consideration of the roads
running northwards across Mount Kithairon to the Boiotian capital. These
roads and passes are clearly described by Mr. Grundy.1
(1) In the east there is the road running through the pass of
Dryoskephalai, familiar to all who have travelled from Athens
to Thebes by diligence. It enters the range under the walls of
Eleutherai, and debouches upon the plain just to the east of
the modern village of Kriek&ki? The point at which it enters
the plain marks the probable site of Erythrai.3
(2) The central road from Athens to Plataiai, with a branch to the
right passing through Hysiai, the site of which, in the main, is
occupied by Krieh&ki.*
(3) The western road and pass, from Megara to Plataiai.
(4) Lastly, a road running from Plataiai to Thebes.6 This road
probably, and the main Dryoskephalai road certainly, crossed
the Asopos by a bridge.
On the eastern road lay the entrenched camp of the Persians, and the
main body of their army, barring all advance northwards. The exact
situation of the camp is a matter of no importance. It probably occupied the
bend of the Asopos, lying on the north bank, quite close to the bridge, the
retention of which was of the utmost moment to the Persians. Their cavalry
must have lain mainly on the south bank. The disposition of the Persians
was admirable, posted as they were behind a by no means contemptible river
in a strongly entrenched camp, covering their communications with a well-
provisioned base.
Mr. Grundy's description of the first position of the Greeks is probably
quite correct.6 They advanced over Mount Kithairon, their objective being
1
 P. 5 fol. Cf. Leake, North. Or. ii. 334 6 Mentioned in Thuc. iii. 24, a passage to be
and map. discussed later.
2
 But modern traffic now follows the loop to 'And is an improvement upon the generally
the left, which actually passes through Kriefc&ki. received view, in which Hysiai is put at Krie-
3
 See Grundy, pp. 6, 9. MM or E. of it, and Erythrai still further E.
* Grundy, p. 15. Grundy, p. 11 fol
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Thebes. As their -point of departure was Eleusis,1 the allies must have
traversed the easy Dryoskephalai pass. On finding the Persians confronting
them they threw themselves in extended order across the Athens-Thebes
road, thus covering their own communications with the Peloponnese and
taking up a favourable position for defence. For as yet it was quite an
open question whether Mardonios would not advance to the attack: the
veriest tiro could not have construed the Persian withdrawal from Attica as
a confession of inferiority. The Greek right rested on the steep slopes of
Mount Kithairon: the centre and left seem to have been thrown forward
somewhat,—probably in order to take advantage of the wells and
conveniences of the village of Erythrai.
The success of the Greeks in dealing with the Persian cavalry2 was so
pronounced that Pausanias was encouraged to make a change of position.3
The inaction of the hostile infantry also contributed to this resolution. Of
greater influence than either of these reasons was the reflection that for the
Greeks to remain passive was to play the Persian game. The masterly
inactivity of Mardonios forced Pausanias to attempt a daring coup. It was at
least better to die free men on a well-fought field than to survive the
consciousness that the liberties of Greece had been betrayed by sitting still.4
The movement contemplated by the Greek commander involved two
serious drawbacks. The hold upon the main road through the range of
Kithairon was relinquished, and a descent was made into ground more
practicable for the enemy's cavalry. Herodotos does not furnish any
satisfactory answer to the inquiry as to how Pausanias justified his evacuation
of the impregnable lines of Mount Kithairon. According to the historian,
the change was suggested solely by convenience of ground,5—the particular
convenience not being revealed, with the exception of the more abundant
water-supply, which was confessedly only one of several advantages. The
ultimate design of Pausanias in descending from the heights must be given
by modern conjecture.
What then was the second position of the Greek army ?
If we read aright the intentions of Pausanias we can put our finger on
the line. It involved a descent (e7n/caTafir}vai), and a movement into the
territory of Plataiai (e? TTJV HXarauSa yfjv). It lay, therefore, N.W. of the
first position. It was reached via the foot-hills of Mount Kithairon and the
village of Hysiai (Sid Tr)<} V7ra>per)<; rod Ktdaip&vo<; irapa 'Taidf). The goal
of the advance lay consequently in the neighbourhood of the Asopos, as is
clear from the subsequent history. Further than this, two points on the line
1
 ix. 19 : a-v/iiityemfs Se iv 'ZXtvatvi. i s Se teides (c. 13). I cannot follow Holm (Grk.
Upa MKOVTO TTIS BOKDTIIJJ es 'EpvBpAs. Hist. ii. 113) in regarding it as 'altogether
2
 ix. 22 fol. : death of Masistios and repulse improbable.' On the contrary it is all of a
of the cavalry. piece with the conduct of the Athenians during
3
 ix. 25 : IfSeJf ff<pt iniKaTafitivcu is UKaraiiis. the campaign.
* Here must be noticed the strange, but in 5 ix. 25: d yty x&pos tyalvero *oAA$ 4iir
my opinion quite true, tale of Plutarch relative iicmfiidnepos . . . ri T« &\\a KO! tivSpirepos.
to the Athenian conspiracy frustrated by Aris-
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*
are expressly named, viz. the Spring Gargaphia and the refievo<s of the hero
Androkrates.
Let us take first the Spring Gargaphia.
Among the low hills on the north of Mount Kithairon there are,
according to Mr. Grundy1, two springs, and only two, that can put forward a
claim to the ancient name. The area of the battle-field is marked by a
distinct depression, which runs from N.E. to S.W. up the Kriekuki brook to
the bottom of the village, and from that point N.W. to the head-waters of
the most westerly tributary of the Asopos (stream A1 in Mr. Grundy's map):
there it joins the plain, which extends northwards from Plataiai. The two
springs lie on the line of this depression. The traditional Gargaphia is the
more westerly of the two, i.e. the modern Apotripi, which lies nearly on the
verge of the plateau, about a quarter of a mile before the Kriekfoki-Pyrgos
path enters the aforesaid plain. Measured upon Mr. Grundy's map, the
distance of this spring from Plataiai is 12 stades. The other spring, or
collection of springs, is found at some distance (on Mr. Grundy's map,
5 stades) east of Apotripi. Mr. Grundy follows Leake in giving the name
Gargaphia to these last sources.2 They lie 14 stades from Plataiai.
What data do we get from Herodotos as to the position of the Spring
Gargaphia ? He gives us the following items:—
(1) It was 10 stades from the 'Island' (c. 51).
(2) It was 20 stades from the Heraion, which was ' in front of'
Plataiai (c. 52).
(3) By implication we learn that it must have been about 10 stades
from the stream called Moloeis, the Argiopian Region, and the
temple of Eleusinian Demeter (c. 57).
With regard to the identification of the ' Island,' it will probably be
generally conceded that Mr. Grundy has made out his case, and satis-
factorily established the locality to which this name was applied.8 More
valuable, however, is his identification of the temple of Demeter.4 No one
can doubt that its place is marked by the modern Church of St. Demetrios.
Only with respect to the temple of Hera is hesitation unfortunately possible.
How do the springs above described square with the data extracted from
Herodotos ?
(1) Measurement shows that the distance of the spring Apotripi
from the ' Island,' as identified by Mr. Grundy, agrees more
1
 P. 16. Cf. Leake, North. Or. ii. 332 fol. to 8 stades in a calculated distance of 20.' Cor-
2
 P. 16. Leake, North. Gr. ii. 333. Mr. recting the measurement as above the error comes
Grundy states that this spring is 16 stades to a choice between 6 and 8 stades,—an im-
rom Plataiai. Comparing this with the 12 material difference. Be it remembered also that
stades of Apotripi he writes,—'It is easy to the point to which the measurement is taken
imagine that a mistake of 4 stades was made in (the temple of Hera) is not yet established,
a measurement of the distance by the eye alone: it 3 P. 27. .
is not so easy to suppose that the error amounted 4 P. 33. • • •
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closely with the statement of Herodotos than does that of his
Gargaphia. At 10 stades from Apotripi we are in the centre
of the Nesos; whereas, measuring from Leake's (and Mr.
Grundy's) Gargaphia, we reach a point too far up the slope of
Mount Kithairon, or else actually find ourselves outside the
limits of the Nesos, in the direction of the town of Plataiai.
(2) The uncertainty with respect to the situation of the Heraion
renders an appeal to measurement here delusive. So far as it
goes, the result seems to point to an exaggeration of the distance
on the part of Herodotos.
(3) Comparison of the interval separating the two springs from the
Eleusinion is decisive against the claims of the well to which
Leake and Mr. Grundy give the name of Gargaphia. Measur-
ing from the Apotripi spring, 9£ stades bring us to the Chapel
of St. Demetrios, 10 stades to the stream flowing along the
S.E. side of the ridge on which that building stands.1 On the
other hand, measuring from Leake's Gargaphia, the Chapel
and stream lie at a distance of only 4 | and 5 stades respec-
tively.2 Yet Mr. Grundy accepts the above-mentioned stream
as the ancient Moloeis and the scene of the final straggle.
We now turn to consider the position of the monument of the hero
Androkrates.
Here we can supplement Herodotos in some slight degree from Thucy-
dides.3 The 212 men who escaped from Plataiai during its investment in
428 B.C. ran at first ' 6 or 7 stades along the road leading to Thebes, having
on their right hand the heroon of Androkrates': subsequently they turned
off to the right and fled in the direction of Mount Kithairon, towards Hysiai
and Erythrai. We notice that whereas Herodotos speaks of a refievoi, or
enclosed domain, Thucydides calls it a f)p£ov, or monumental chapel. It
must have been a building standing in the midst of a sacred enclosure,
which was probably planted with trees. That this was indeed the case we
learn from Plutarch, who describes the heroon of Androkrates as 'sur-
rounded with a dense grove of shady trees.'4
Few can have read the passage in Thucydides without having been
struck by the apparent pointlessness of his remark as to the position of the
1
 Stream A5 on Mr. Grundy's map. eirrh araSiovs ol nAaraiTjs T V M T&V eqjSwe
8
 Yet Mr. Grundy writes (p. 33) : ' I t will be ixdpyvav, tirei6' itroOTptyavTes f,«rav T V "?&$
seen on the map that the distance from the rb ipos iptpovaav 6Sbv 4s 'EpiOpas icaX "taiks teal
position of the Spartans near the spring which Ka&Spcyoi rav opav Sicupeiyovaiv is Ttks 'Aftyiw
Leake (rightly, I think, as I have previously Grundy (p. 10 fol.) quite accurately gives the
said) identifies with Gargaphia, accords closely route followed by the fugitives,
with the distance given by Herodotus.' * Plut. Arist. xi. : rb TOW 'AvSpoKpirovs
3
 Time. iii. 24 : ol nKarairjs 4x<ipew aSpooi r\p^ov . . &\<rti ITVKVUV ical avaxiuv StvSpwv
T^y is 0-iifias tpepovaav SSbv iv 5e£iS i^ovres rb Trepiex6/i.evov.
TOV 'AvSpoicp&TOvs ypifov. . . . KO! i^rj ;uee i{ t)
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monument in question. For if the heroon lay hard by the road, constituting
a familiar landmark, it was surely needless to insist upon its relation to
travellers advancing along that road in the direction of Thebes. A closer
examination, however, removes this seeming pointlessness. In addition to
the regular high road from Plataiai to Thebes (4), a man might cross the low
hills in a N.E. direction1 and so strike either the road that issued from the
pass of Hysiai (2), or the main road from Athens (1) issuing from the pass
of Erythrai (Dryoskephalai). The remark of Thucydides, that the heroon
stood on the right hand of the fugitives, thus turns out to possess consider-
able value.2 It fixes their point of exit from the town to the northern
section of the enclosing lines, and the route of flight to a northerly direction,
thus indirectly eliminating the possibility indicated above,—that the exit
was made on the N.E. of the town and the line of flight continued towards
the same point of the compass. The corollary from this is that the site of
the monument should be sought between the line of the Plataiai-Thebes
road and the line of the path that runs to the north-east: in other words, it
is an entire mistake to imagine that the heroon lay quite close to the Plataiai-
Thebes road, i.e. in the plain itself.
In addition to the passage from Thucydides, we are able to adduce one
from Plutarch. It is true that, as history, Plutarch's account of the
campaign is of small value. Nevertheless, the circumstance that Plutarch
was a Boiotian, and the probability that he knew the ground, combine to give
some importance to the few topographical details preserved in his Life of
Aristeides. It is only by the adoption of a foregone conclusion that his
testimony is brought into conflict with that of Thucydides. We refuse to
subscribe to the verdict of Mr. Grundy 3 when he declares that ' one has to
stretch the language of Plutarch until it cracks in order to reconcile his
topography with that of Thucydides.'
In describing the movement of the allied army to its second position,
1
 In other words, taking the path chosen by must refuse to acknowledge with Mr. Grundy,
the Corinthians in their march from the Heraion that ' it is evident that Thucydides understood
to the scene of action, as related in Herod, ix. the 'ttpyov to be less than three-quarters of a
69 : tjih rrjs inruperis Kal rav KoKtevmv T^P <pcpov- mile from Plataea.' The outcome of this as-
aav iva I9ii rov ipov rrjs A^UTJTJIOS. Such would sumption is Mr. Grundy's hypothesis of a triple
not of course be the usual path from Plataiai to phase of the Greek second position. AU^that
Thebes, but it might well have been followed Thucydides says, is that the fleeing Plataians
by the fugitives, whose objective was not ran about a mile along that road to Thebes
Thebes, as it had the advantage of bringing which lay to the left, or west, of the monument:
them nearer the passes into Attica while avoid- that they actually passed the monument is
ing the obviously dangerous route along the nowhere stated.
base of Kithairon. 3 P. 35 note. An example of wrong method
2
 The words iy 8e{i§ (x'"'Tes ^ T°v 'AvSpo- adopted by Mr. Grundy from Leake, North. Gr.
Kpirovs ypyov are inserted for no other purpose ii. 354, a passage which Mr. Grundy quotes with
than to define exactly the preceding phrase T V approval. Mr. Grundy makes much of Plut-
1s &fiftas qipovaav iSiv,—a phrase which was arch's failure to mention the vrjaos. It will be
equally applicable to the alternative path men- seen that Plutarch is in the right: the situation
tioned by me. It is ordinarily assumed that of the yrjaos is of no moment, as we might
the fugitives passed the monument in question. guess from the fact that not one of the Greek
For this opinion I can see no warrant, and I .contingents ever reached it.
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Plutarch writes as follows,—' near Hysiai, at the foot of Kithairon, there is an
ancient temple of Demeter and Kore, and there hard by was also the heroon of
Androkrates.1' The natural inference from this is that Plutarch imagined
the Eleusinion and the heroon to have been fairly close together. Compare
this with what Herodotos tells us about the enclosure of Androkrates2,—' and
there they ranged themselves, nation by nation, close by the fountain
Gargaphia and the sacred precinct of the hero Androkrates, partly among
hills of no great elevation, and partly upon level ground.' What is there in
this to support the double assumption on the part of Mr. Grundy3 that
Herodotos meant to give us the two extremes of the Greek line, and to
indicate at the same time that the spring lay among the hills while the
monument stood in the plain, i.e. on the left wing ? The conclusion to which
both Herodotos and Plutarch point is that the heroon of Androkrates and the
Spring Gargaphia stood (within reasonable limits) in the same area.4 What
this area was we have already ascertained for the spring. What it was for
the heroon we have already deduced from the words of Thucydides. The
two streams of evidence guide us to one and the same point for the site of
heroon and refievo<;. That site is marked by the modern Chapel of St. John
crowning the height which rises immediately to the north of the Apotripi
(Gargaphia) spring.6
What then do we conclude as to the second position of the Greeks ? It
occupied the depression which Mr. Grundy describes6 as running across the
battle-field roughly from east to west. Here the allies had the advantage of
a supply of water in the Apotripi (Gargaphia) spring,—the sources farther to
the east would obviously also be in their hands; they were screened from the
observation of the Persian main body; they were also protected from the
cavalry as well as was possible anywhere off the actual slopes of Mount
Kithairon.7 The Greek outposts would occupy the heights to the north of
1
 Plut. Arist. xi. : -r&v "taiav tt\t)<riav {nth TOV of Arch. vol. vi. 471).
Kidaip&va vaos iffTiv apx<*!os n&w A^/HJT/JOJ * The same conclusion seems to follow from
'EAfvo-ivlas K O I Kipris irpoffayopevofiepris . . . . Palls, ix. 4, 2, where the Temple of Eleusinian
AVTOV 5* %v Ka\ TO TOV 'AvSpoKpdrovs ypyov Demeter, the /j.vijfia of Leitos and the Spring
iyyis, £\<r« TrvKvUv nal ffvffxiav 8eV5pa»/ vepie- Gargaphia are apparently grouped together as
xd/ievov. contiguous to one another. We may note here
2
 Herod, ix. 25 : airixd/ievoi St iriaamro KOT" that Mr. Grundy is altogether wrong in imagin-
(8yea TrX-Qoiov Tijs re Kp4]vr)s TTJS Tapyaipins xal ing (p. 34) the temple of Demeter here spoken
TOV Tfneveos TOS 'AvSpoKpdrtos TOV ijpcoos Sill of by Pausanias to be different from that
6x9o»> re OIIK ityTjAiw xa! airedov x<»piov. mentioned by Herodotos in his account of the
3
 P. 36 note: ' I think that the words of battle.
Herodotus . . . can only mean that the rtfitvos 5 Taking into consideration what is told us
was on the left of the Greek line, for the aWSos of the heroon by Plutarch in the passage already
X&pos can only be the plain between Plataea and quoted, I see in the modern name Platdni
the Thespian Asopus, on which, by-the-bye, ( = Plane tree), borne by the locality indicated,
according to Thucydides the riyxvos must have a traditional survival of the old Hellenic
stood.' Of. p. 17: 'the riixevos of the hero riiitvos. See Leake's map. The huts round
Androcrates, which Herodotus tells us was the the chapel have apparently disappeared, but
other extremity of the line, i.e., on the left the memory of the name remains,
wing.' The same assumption is made by Stein 6 P. 2.
(note in loc.) and Grote, (Hist. v. 19 note 2), but 7 The description of the position and its
is rightly combated by Mr. Hunt (Amer. Journ, advantages, as given in Diod. xi. 30, 5 [liv yip
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the position, viz. the height on which the heroon stood, and the eminence
lying to the east, between the heroon and the temple of Demeter.
The object aimed at by Pausanias in removing from- Mount Kithairon is
rightly stated by Mr. Grundy.1 The Greeks tried to effect a great turning
movement by their left. They threw themselves upon the Plataiai-Thebes
road, intending to force the passage of the Asopos and to cut the Persian line
of communication. Mr. Grundy justly calls attention to the fact that the
military capacity of Pausanias is universally underrated. For boldness
of design, prudence in execution, and power of handling masses of men in the
face of almost insuperable obstacles he deserves a high place in the list of
Greek generals. Under the conditions of ancient warfare the undertaking
was not as desperate as it would seem.2 In the absence of long-range
weapons and arms of precision, it was perfectly feasible. Moreover the
advantage in skill, discipline, and equipment was overwhelmingly in favour of
the Greeks.3 The Persians might well have been driven eastwards off their
line of retreat. It was necessary, however, to take precautions against the
Persian cavalry, which was massed on the Greek right flank, at a distance of
at most three miles. A sort of dchelon formation was therefore adopted, the
Greek contingents being disposed obliquely from S.E. to N.W. across the roads
leading from Plataiai to Thebes.
It is at this point that we begin to find the narrative of Herodotos
interrupted and distorted by the national bias of his Athenian informants.
Here for the first time the historian directs our attention to the
disposition of the Greek troops. He goes off at the word /car'effvea (c. 25)
and introduces the quarrel between the Tegeans and the Athenians for the
post of danger and honour on the wing (cc. 26-28 init.) The whole of the
story must be excised, on the following grounds :—
(1) The left wing of the Greeks in the second position lay
on iTnrdai/ios ^w/>os.4 It might consequently expect to suffer
from the attacks of the hostile cavalry, as was actually the case
(c. 49 end). How then reconcile the Tegean demand for
station on the left wing with their previous reluctance (shared
by the whole army) to support the Megarians against the
Persian cavalry in the first position ?6 It is not sufficient
to advert to the success already gained against the cavalry
(K iilr ruv Se£iuv ytd\o<pos {nj/ti\6s, 4K Se rav river Nebel and the marshes on its banks.
tvavi/uev 6 'Arunrbs TrorafiSs- rhv 5' i c i jueVov Compare also the passage of the Granikos by
rinov itreixtv V <TTparovfSeta, re(ppayn4vri T?j Alexander.
<pi<rti (col TOIS ruv r6irav curipahelats), is clearly 3 Cf. Holm, Grlc. Hist. ii. 75 (E.T.): ' t he
simply modelled upon that of Thermopylai, and Greeks were well-handled bodies of heavily-
oannot be pressed into service here. armed infantry.'
1
 Pp. 22, 43. 4 Cf. ix. 2 5 : Si' oWSou X"p''ov; 3 1 : M T 0
3
 The situation finds its counterpart in the 'A<ranr$; 49 : 6 Se 'Aounhs hyxav.
battle of Blenheim. The Asopos did not con- 6 ix. 21.
stitute a more formidable obstacle than did the
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(c. 25) and to the confidence thereby inspired, for the service
now demanded- was much more than steadiness against
cavalry.
(2) There is no evidence to support the statement made, according
to Herodotos, by the Tegeans, that post on a wing was their
prerogative. Subsequently at any rate we find the Tegeans
occupying precisely the station finally allotted to them on the
field of Plataiai, i.e. next to the Spartans themselves. This is
the case in 418 B.C. at the battle of Mantineia,1 and in 394 B.C.
at the battle of Corinth.2
(3) How was it that the Corinthians, 5000 strong, did not raise
objections if they were moved from the side of the Spartans,
presumably a post of honour, in order to make room for the
Tegeans ?
(4) The Tegean demand, if ever urged, must have been decided
instantly by tactical considerations. A large compact body,
like that of the Athenians (8000 in number), which was
accompanied by the best light troops in the army (archers), was
required on the wing, not the Tegean handful of 1500.
(5) The story of Herodotos is irreconcilable with the words which
occur in chap. 28,—' The place next to themselves was given
by the Spartans to the Tegeans, on account of their courage and
of the esteem in which they held them.'3 These words suggest that
their actual place in the line was assigned to the Tegean
hoplites in pursuance of some plan not given in Herodotos.
The nature of the plan will clearly appear in the sequel.
(6) The quarrel, if a genuine incident, must have occurred earlier
than is stated by Herodotos; It must in fact have broken out
at the moment of taking position on Mount Kithairon. For
the evidence goes to show that there also the Tegeans had not
been posted on the wing.4
1
 Time. v. 71. 4 In the second position the Megarians are
2
 Xen. Hell. iv. 2, 19. And at that battle third in the line, reckoning from the left, i.e.
of Mantineia in which Epameinondas fell in they stand next on the right of the Plataians and
362 B.c. the Tegeans apparently stood next to Athenians. This place apparently corresponds
theThebans, i.e. the leaders, in this case on the to that which they held in the first position :
left wing. Cf. Diod. xv. 85, 2 : eijflaioi 8' for there also they occupied the left centre (cf.
axiToX /lev eirl rb fbiim/iov Kepas iT<i.x9ri<Tav, ix. 2 1 : tieyapees iroxov TOxfleWej Trj re T&
Trapcurri-ras txovTfs 'Apic&Sas, rb 8e 5e|iby nape- iiri/iax&TaTov %v TO5 xapl°v »awrfi, «al TJ irp6<r-
Saxav 'Apyetois K.T.X. The point is that they oSos naKiara rairri iyivero Tp Tim-ip,—this can
stand shoulder to shoulder with the premier only have been on the left and left centre of the
corps, whatever its position. line). To this we ought to add the considera-
3
 ix. 28: irpoo-fX"" S4 o$i efaoiro i&T&vai oi tion that, if the Tegeans had been on the wing
Srap-riiJTai robs Teydiras /col Tt/tjjs fiveicev KO! in the first position, they would have urged
aptrrft. that as an argument here.
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On these grounds we unhesitatingly reject the story of the quarrel. It
is an Athenian invention designed to flatter Athens by means of a verdict
put into the mouths of the best troops in Greece, at the expense of a
contingent second to none in valour (c. 28).1
In fact, the whole account of the marshalling of the Greek troops comes
far too late in the narrative. Their arrangement in the line must have dated
from the opening day of the campaign. With it disappears also the account
of the marshalling of the Persian forces. There was no such formal parataxis
as Herodotos depicts. The place of the account, which is closely modelled
on the epic, is determined solely by artistic reasons, without reference to the
logic of military practice. It is inserted precisely at this point because we
have reached a crucial stage of the campaign: but the arrangement of the
troops strictly belongs to an earlier moment, while the quarrel to which it is
represented as giving rise is a pure fiction.
Having thus adopted from his epic model a quite artificial scheme of
events, how does Herodotos proceed to develop it ? Here we have the two
armies ranged and described in battle array, but—nothing comes of it. Re-
course is had to the sacrifices in order to explain the refusal of the combatants
to finish the business, thus happily begun, in the true Homeric fashion.2
Herodotos is manifestly quite in the dark as to the real reason for their delay.
His assertion of the only obstacle that would appeal to his hearers,—the
persistent veto of heaven,—involves him in difficulties, as it directly contra-
dicts the account given in chap. 41, which relates the conference of the
Persian officers. For if Mardonios was so eager to fight,3 why had he not
long ago given battle ? It was surely not out of respect for the feelings of
the Greek contingents fighting on the Persian side that he had conformed to
the utterances of their soothsayers. Why should Mardonios summon his Staff
only to insult it ? The episode of the conference is inserted for no other
purpose than that of enabling Herodotos to contrast dramatically, more mo,
two antithetical solutions of the situation,—on the one hand decisive battle
for good or ill, on the other the sound policy of waiting for disaffection and
bribery to do their fatal work upon the national forces.4
Next there follows the account of the midnight visit of Alexander of
Macedon to the Athenian lines.5 This also is a story full of improbabilities,
and without any claim to retention. How did Alexander escape recognition
at the bridge-head held by the Persians ? Or, if that is supposed to be no
difficulty, how did his errand elude the notice of the Persian sentinels ? If
again these imagined him to be the bearer of despatches to the Greeks, where
1
 The "turn of expression in the concluding impression of delay in the action.
sentences (chap. 28) is designedly invidious,— • ix. 37 : MapSorlip Be irpoSuneo/idytp fi&xys
AOrivalovs attovncorepovs elvai ?X€1" T^> Kepas fipxe"' °"K emriiSea iyiycro TA Ipi. Cf. chap.
ijwcp 'ApxdSas. Who does not recognize the 4 1 : MapSivios irepirineKTee TTJ c&py.
curl of the lip in this ? 4 Partly also Herodotos design to give
2
 Observe how skilfully the history of the expression to his own opinion on the situation,
various soothsayers (ix. 33-38 init.) is used in 6 ix. 44 fol.
order to interrupt the narrative and to give the
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was the risk of which he makes so much ?1 The reasons which he alleges to
account for the Persian delay in attacking are very obviously put into his
mouth by Herodotos himself in conformity with what he has already written
in chaps. 36, 37. The assertion that the Persians found their commissariat
breaking down is a manifest lie.2 The very emphatic and artistically well-
managed revelation of his name on the part of Alexander was quite super-
fluous to Aristeides, who must have become familiar in Athens with the face,
figure, and tones of the Macedonian king.3 Lastly, the whole point of the
clandestine interview was to warn the Greeks of the intention of Mardonios
to fight a decisive battle on the morrow.4 Yet, in spite of the alleged
eagerness of the Persian general and the difficulties threatening his army,
the following day passed without any serious attempt being made to justify
the Macedonian's prognostications.
The excision of the nocturnal visit of Alexander necessarily involves also
the abandonment of the disgraceful story contained in chaps. 46, 47. Ac-
cording to Herodotos, the near prospect of encounter with the Persians and
Medes so alarmed Pausanias that he suggested to the Athenian leaders an
interchange of position on the part of their respective divisions. The
Athenians moved to the right, while the Spartans withdrew to the left in
order to face the Boiotians and the other Greeks who fought in the ranks of
the Great King. The exchange, however, was detected by the Boiotians, who
at once informed Mardonios. The Persian troops were consequently trans-
ferred to the right of their line, so as to bring them once more in front of the
Spartans. Pausanias then for the second time changed his position, and
resumed his post on the right wing. Finally, the Persians returned to their
old station, and the farce was brought to an end.
' No incident similar to this,' remarks Grote,5' will be found throughout
the whole course of Lacedaemonian history.' He might safely have gone
further and denied that any such incident ever did occur. From beginning to
end the story must be stigmatised as a slander.
(1) If the Spartans had contemplated the movement at all, for what
had they delayed its execution ? They could not have foreseen
that they would receive timely warning of the approaching
battle, nor yet that the Persian onset would be retarded long
enough to enable the change in position to be made. It is
evident that the proposition was only possible upon a very
ix< 45: ts 'EWfauv tXvtxev OVTU tpyov 3 On the occasion of his visit to Athens as
ov (pyaaiuu i*b irpoflu/tfajs. special envoy from Mardonios, Herod, viii. 136.
2
 ix. 4 5 : ixlyaiv yap tripi fiiitptwv KelireTai Alexander we there read had a compact of
atria. How is this to be reconciled with the friendship (TrpofeWa) with Athens,
words of Artabazos—ix. 41 : rb Te<x«s rb * ix. 45 : vvv Si ol SiSoxrai ra fxlv tr<j>dyia 4av
QriBaiav, tv9a airiv ri tripi eopey?(j'e<x'0' itoWhr xa'Pe'v! "Ma WfP!J &' 5ta(pu><ricov<ry (TUJUJBOAV
KCU x&PTor roiai btro&yloun 1 Cf. Rawlinson, iroieeaBat. Cf. chap. 42 : (ariix-qvt •napapritaSai
iv. 412 note 9 : ' i t is evident from their whole re Tr&vra KOX tixpivia TtotUadai a>s afut rmcpp rp
history that the commissariat of the Persians eVioucrp avu-0o\ris iaopiivTis.
was excellently managed.' 6 Hist, of Greece, v. 25.
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general and decided feeling in its favour on the part of the
Spartan hoplites; hence it cannot be set down to a sudden
nervousness depriving Pausanias of self-command.
(2) It was surely a strange preparation for the decisive struggle,
fraught with such grave consequences for Greece, to march
and countermarch the best regiments of the allied army in the
face of the enemy.
(3) What was the effect of the Spartan cowardice upon the mass of
the Greek troops ? The motive of the manoeuvre must, one
thinks, have been as apparent to the rank and file of the con-
tingents as to the Athenian hoplites.
(4) How is it that we never subsequently hear a syllable of this
compliment to Athenian arms ?
(5) The genesis of the story can be traced quite satisfactorily.
As the last of our long series of excisions we must abandon the incident
narrated in c. 48. Mardonios sent a herald to the Greek lines with an absurd
challenge, proposing that the Spartans and the Persians should fight on
behalf of all. It is obvious that if the attempted change of post is cut out
it must carry with it the challenge. It is modelled upon similar scenes
in Homer; but it is also not uninfluenced by reminiscences of previous
history.1 Apart from this, the narrative is intrinsically unsound; for how do
the words ' puffed up by the empty victory'2 square with the statement that
nothing more was attempted or achieved against the Greeks than the
usual harassing attacks of the cavalry ? We expect some deed of arms to
redeem the doughty resolves of chap. 41.
Now that the ground has been cleared of the excrescences due to
Athenian light-hearted manipulation of history let us resume the interrupted
story of the Greek movements.
We have surmised that the movement of the allies to the second position.
was based upon something more than the desire merely to obtain a better
supply of water: for the abandonment of their main line of communication
and the greater exposure to the Persian cavalry on the lower ground were
attendant drawbacks too serious to be counterbalanced by the single
advantage named by Herodotos. Pausanias had determined to make a dash
across the Asopos by the road which ran directly from Plataiai. The second
Greek position represents the army in the act of carrying out this manoeuvre.
It is disposed obliquely across the field, the left wing leading upon the
Asopos.3
1
 Cf. Horn. II. iii. 90 fol. Combat of onset was designed to introduce the infantry
champions was unsuccessfully used to decide attack, why did that attack not ensue in due
the claims of Sparta and Argos to the Thyreatis, course ? Confessedly (according to Herodotos)
Herod, i. 82 (Thuc. v. 41). the cavalry were more successful this day than
2
 ix. 49 : S Sk Ttptxapiis yevi/icvos nal iiraep- ever before.
Belt i*vxpfj "i"V i*VK* T^v hirov iirl robs ' See Note A on the Asopos of Herodotos.
°%\\i)vas. If it is argued that the cavalry
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Why then was the offensive designed by the Spartan general not
developed beyond this point; and why do we not find in Herodotos a
syllable in allusion either to the scheme itself or to its collapse ?
The first difficulty is solved by reference to the position of Pausanias.
The army under his command consisted practically of three brigades
constituted respectively by the Spartans (with whom we must reckon the
Tegeans), the Athenians (along with the Plataians), and lastly the general
body of the allies. The loose structure of the Greek national levy made
unanimity in sentiment and cohesion in action impossible beyond certain
narrow limits. Hence the delay in accomplishing the passage of the
river, a delay that ruined the scheme, and all but ruined the national
cause.
The latter part of our question is answered by reference to the ignorance
of the historian's informant, who was quite in the dark as to the strategic
ideas of the Greek commander-in-chief.
Another cause also is at work. It must be remembered that the
campaign was a national affair, and it was undoubtedly a point of national
honour to present it in the most favourable light. By tacit general consent
the battle never became the subject of discussion. An analogy may be found
in the medism of the Delphic oracle, which yet, by a species of national self-
deception, did not forfeit its claim to Hellenic respect, in spite of its failure in
the hour of trial.1 So in the case before us, no Greek would have been so
unpatriotic as to confess that dilatoriness and cowardice on the part of the
national army had nearly proved fatal to Hellenic freedom.
We must also bear in mind that our knowledge comes almost entirely
from the Athenians, and only from a certain section of them, so that we know
scarcely anything of the views current outside Athens.2 In spite of Athenian
reticence, however, we clearly see that hesitation on the part of the Greek
force, and more especially on the part of the Athenian contingent, which was
in the van, enabled the Persians to divine the intentions of the Greek
commander, and gave them time to perform a lateral movement in order to
cover the Plataiai-Thebes road. Their clouds of skirmishers then effectually
prevented all approach to the Asopos, and the favourable moment was
lost.8
This brings us to the origin of the story, already condemned, which is so
discreditable to the Spartans.
The Athenians, being on the left extremity of the line, which rested on
the Asopos, would cross the river at the head of the column. After crossing
1
 Cf. Holm, Ork. Hist. ii. 60 (E.T.). lining the Asopos banks are regarded by the
s
 Can we, for example, believe that the tradition as designed to entice the Greeks
Athenian version of the retirement of the centre across the river (chap. 40: /i4xpt M^ 7*P TOV
to the Heraion (ix. 52) passed current among 'Ao-anroS &nfftru> ot P&pflapoi, iceipeAiievot rav
the states whose troops were implicated in that *EUiirar). Such are the marks of a literary
movement ? battle, not the touches of a man versed in the
3
 ix. 49 : ipvKiiuvoi 8« airh TOS 'AffwiroC. By actual experiences of the field,
a strange inversion the Persian skirmishers
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they would wheel to the Tight, in order to check the Persian advance along
the bank to hinder the passage. The Spartans, who were posted on the
extreme right, formed the rear-guard of the column, and covered the crossing
from the Persian cavalry,—a most dangerous and responsible position, and
one that explains why the valiant Tegeans were associated with the Spartan
hoplites.1 When the whole Greek force had made good its footing on the far
side of the Asopos, the Spartans would naturally form the left wing of the
new line. It is on this reversal of position,—one suggested, but never actually
realized,—that the Athenian misrepresentation is based.2 It contains this much
of truth, that the brunt of the fighting, until the Spartan rear-guard effected
its passage of the river, must have fallen upon the Athenians, who were
required to sustain the whole weight of the Persian attack upon the head of
the column.3 There was surely honour enough in that to have rendered
superfluous the sorry attempt to cast shame upon the best troops in Greece,—
the more so as it was entirely due to the Athenians' own want of resolution
that the Spartan valour was not put to the test contemplated by
Pausanias.
The warp of the tissue of these fifty chapters is the green thread of
Athenian jealousy of Sparta.4 It is a highly suggestive fact that we find both
the Spartans and the Tegeans,—who shared the honour of the final victory,—
more or less skilfully represented in Herodotos as inferior to the Athenian
troops. And in each instance we have been forced to the conclusion that the
episode is false and due to Athenian vanity. The cloven hoof is unmistakably
displayed in the account of the events following the challenge feigned to have
been thrown down by Mardonios. With what painful circumstantiality are
we assured that it was to the Spartans, and the Spartans alone, that the
thanks of the allies were'due for the destruction of the Spring Gargaphia s :
as though to give point to the alleged reluctance of the Spartans to face
Persian infantry by instancing this, probably equally fictitious, failure to stand
against Persian cavalry.6 If these things were done in the green tree, what
1
 ix. 28 : Tpo<rex*as ' e ' ff<P' «?Aoi"ro effravm o< is merely again the self-laudatory Athenian
SiropTt^Toi robs Teycffras Kal Ttfiijs eXveicey KOI tradition.
iperfis. 4 Contrast the reiterated jubilation found in
2
 Possibly also the Persian change of position, our Athenian sources over the victory at Mara-
from the left to the right wing, is a genuine thon with the silence observed with regard to
incident: the change might very probably be the brilliant achievement of the Spartans and
actually made in order to meet the threatened Arkadians at Plataiai.
advance of the Greek left. s ix. 49 : 9j<rav /aiv &v Karh. T^V Kptivriv Aa/ce-
3
 This is the truth underlying the garbled SaifiSviot reray/itvot fiovvot. Here again t ie
account in Plutarch of the grumbling on the phrasing is used with set purpose.
part of the Athenians against Pausanias. 'They 6 Here I may say that I see no sort of
thought that Pausanias carried it with a partial evidence for Mr. Grundy's laboured hypothesis
and high hand in moving them up and down, of three ' developments' of the Greek second
like so many Helots, at his pleasure, to face the position. His theory leaves him with 100,000
boldest of the enemy's troops.' This surely men huddled on a single hill, cut off from
alludes to the disposition of troops previous to water, harassed by cavalry, and with morale at
the crossing of the river. Plutarch's sequel zero point. Surely this 'development' could
(the speech of Aristeides and consequent con- issue only in tragedy,
sent of the Athenians to change their position)
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would have been done in the dry ! Recall also the invidious expressions used
with reference to Spartan duplicity, so different from the manly and
straightforward, withal modest, character of the Athenians,1 and the
reference to the by this time threadbare theme of Spartan cowardice, so
glaringly in contrast with the calm steadfastness of conscious valour that
glowed in the breast of the Athenian hoplite.2 Nay, the Spartans must be
flouted even at the price of complimenting an almost equally odious people.
Therefore is it recorded that the Tegeans charged the Persian rampart of
shields before that the Spartans advanced a foot3: far be it from the
Athenians to see any other city deprived of its meed of honour for the sake of
other than—themselves! Lastly, what prominence is given to the Athenian
share in the assault on the fortified camp.4 Well might this be so, else were
the hoplites of Athens like to have been but sleeping partners in that day's
achievements. Here as so often, the Lakedaimonians were baffled by the
combination of barricades and stout defence. Not until the invincible
amalgam of Athenian valour and resolution (aperr/ ical Xnrapir)) 5 was applied
could any impression be made on the fortifications. Into the breach there
rushed, not the Spartans,—alas for that national defect of ponderosity,—but
the Tegeans.
With the end of chap. 49 there comes a change in the nature of the
Greek operations,—a change from offensive to defensive tactics. The allied
army, having lost the opportunity of turning the Persian position, is reduced
to its old attitude of covering the approaches to the Peloponnese, and of
waiting for Mardonios to take the initiative.6
The real objective of the movement of the Greeks to the 'Island' was
the recovery of their line of communication, upon which they had then but
precarious hold. They were, it is true, not driven entirely off it, for, as
Mr. Grundy points out,7 the Plataiai-Megara pass (3) still remained in their
hands. Nevertheless, according to Mr. Grundy, the character of the most
westerly pass is such as to render it impossible to supply satisfactorily the
wants of one hundred thousand men through this channel alone. That the
occupation of the eastern passes by the Persian advanced posts had begun to
tell upon the Greek forces may readily be believed, but Herodotos himself
represents the determination to fall back as due primarily to want of water,8
in consequence of the failure of the Spartans to protect Gargaphia.
1
 i x . 54 : TA AaKeSai/iovliiiy <ppov4)na.Ta &s liWa Se <T<pi oi 'k9i)vatot Tpoari\6ov . . . . TfKos 8e
<ppope6vrwv /col &K\a \eyivrwy. For A t h e n i a n apprtj re Ka\ Anrapiy iireflricrav 'Ath)vaioi TOS
mock modesty, see chap. 46 end. relxfos K.T.\.
2
 ix. 56 : 'AtHivtuot 5c TaxOcrres fXaav Ttt 5 This ' bull-dog obstinacy' is precisely the
fpiraKiv t) Aaic*$ain6viot. oi per 7&p TUV T« quality usually attributed to the Spartans. At
Sx9a>i> avrflxovTo KOI TTJS inruperjs TO5 KiBaipHfos, any rate Thucydides recognizes this,—v. 7 3 :
•poffti/jifvoi T V Tiriroy, 'A6t)caioi Se Kara rptup- xpo^ovs riis fiaxts xal 0e0aiovs T # fihtw
Sevres is rb veStav. irotovvrcu.
3
 ix. 62 : -Kpoelavaarivres Trpjrtpoi ol TeyeTJrat " See Note B for the chronology of the events
ix&ptw « ™iis 0ap$dpovs. preceding the battle of Plataiai.
4
 ix. 70: £a>s /lei/ yip htijffav oi 'Afcjrcuot, oi 7 P. 32.
8" itiiivovro xal itoWf *\4ov fix0" T<°>' AcuceSai- s ix. 5 0 : ire rov r* SSaros cTTcpij8«f(ri)s TTJJ
povlctv &art ol>n iiriarajievav Tei^o^axe'eiv, us ffrpaTirjs.
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This repetition of the water difficulty we should be inclined to reject here
again, at any rate as furnishing the ground of the retirement. For, wherever
we place Qargaphia, the army had still the other spring at its command; and
Herodotos admits that at the foot of Mount Kithairon, ten stades or so in the
rear of the position, water was abundant.1 There was also the water supply
of the town of Plataiai itself.2 For surely the Greeks ought not to be
imagined as cut off from Plataiai and the base of the hills, and hopelessly
surrounded by the Persian horsemen. There cannot have been any grave
difficulty in supplying the needs of the troops in line on the Spring Gargaphia,3
as the country between that position and the mountain is by no means
difficult. The stress laid upon the deficiency of water, if not due to the
character of the historian's informant, has its origin in the desire to bring in
the Spartans as ultimately responsible for a retrograde movement primarily
caused by the Athenians themselves.
The main features of this last act of the drama, as given by the Athenian
tradition, are as follows.4
The council of generals determined to execute a night movement to the
rear, the so-called ' Island ' being given as the rendezvous of the contingents.
It was further resolved that, on the same night, half the army should be
detached eastwards to Mount Kithairon, in order to extricate the commissariat
train blocked up in the pass. When the appointed hour arrived the centre
fell back,—not to the ' Island,' i.e. 10 stades, but 20 stades, finally taking post
at the Heraion, which lay 'in front of Plataiai. Next, the Spartans were
ordered to retire ; but the irrational obstinacy of the Lochagos Amompharetos,
who construed the movement as a flight, detained the Spartan contingent all
night. Meantime the Athenians, suspecting the Spartans of a desire to play
them false, remained in position on the left awaiting definite instructions.
As day dawned, Pausanias at last abandoned his recalcitrant captain to his
fate, and set his troops in motion ' along the line of the hills.' The Athenians
also retired, by way of the plain. After marching 10 stades Pausanias halted
for the Pitanate regiment under Amompharetos on the stream called Moloeis,
near a temple of Eleusinian Demeter, in the district called Argiopian.
Simultaneously with the appearance of Amompharetos the Persian cavalry
swooped down upon the Spartans and Tegeans, to be followed soon by the
Persian infantry.
Such is the narrative of Herodotos, deceptive in its simplicity and
apparent straightforwardness. Closer examination reveals in it the features
with which we have become familiar. On the one hand Herodotos fails to
appreciate the significance of the various movements of the forces, on the
1
 ix. 51 : is TOVTOV SJ) rbv x^pov 40ov\ei<ravro ties of the Helots and light troops in attend-
pvravaa-rr\vai (sc. the ' Island'), Ira KUI S8BTI ance on the hoplites ? They were apparently of
tx<°<ri xpofffloi a<pe6vtf. not the slightest use against the cavalry. We
2
 Assuming that the town had other sources may remark here, by the way, that no one can
of supply than the springs commanded by the take seriously their numbers as given by Hero-
' Island.' dotos.
3
 For what other service engaged the aetivi- * ix. 50-57.
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other he has incorporated all that national vanity, with the double object of
glorifying Athens and disparaging Sparta, had invented.
Up to this point in the story the central brigade of the allies has escaped
Athenian calumny; its share in events is shadowy, but not actually dis-
graceful. Its turn has at last come. Although the troops of the centre had
borne the heat and burden of the day that proved so disastrous to Spartan
prestige, yet now, under the cloak of night, they flee in headlong haste, eager
only to secure themselves against the dreaded cavalry. Mark, however, the
point wherein the narrative halts. In spite of their anxiety to put themselves
beyond the reach of the Persian horsemen, the contingents of the centre do
not seek shelter in Plataiai itself nor on the rocky slopes of Mount Kithairon
(which ultimately became their refuge *), nor yet on the ' Island,'—a position
admittedly outside the sphere of cavalry operations,2—but they take up their
station, apparently in good order,' in front of' the temple, which was itself
' in front of the town. '3
There are several possible sites for the Heraion.4 The most probable one
stands within the circuit of the existing enceinte of Plataiai, just to the east of
the akropolis. The question of the site is of far greater moment than is the
identification of the ' Island,' which was in fact never reached by any of the
Greek force at all.5 Its importance lies in this, that, knowing the exact site
of the temple, we should be able to decide what amount of credence should
attach to the Athenian account of the conduct of the troops composing the
centre.
That account can hardly be accepted as it stands. It will be observed
that the suggested site of the Heraion lies at no great distance 6 from the
tract of ground which is convincingly identified by Mr. Grundy as the
' Island.' The Heraion may well, therefore, have been actually the position
which the central brigade was instructed to occupy. Its proximity to the town7
is an important feature; it was surely of some moment for the Greeks to
retain possession of Plataiai, which was a fortified place commanding the
entrance of the pass to Megara. In order to carry out the project of
Pausanias it was essential to dispose the various brigades in such a way
1
 When cut to pieces by the Theban cavalry,
ix. 69.
4
 ix. 5 1 : is rovrov SJ) rbv x^Pov (sc- the
' Island') i&ovXeiaaVTO luravao-Trivai Iva . . oi
itrvees fftpcus fify fftvoiarot &ffv€p icaridv iivrtov.
3
 ix. 52 : ol St us iiuv4](hioav, f<pevyov &trfievoi
TJ)C Jirirov irpbs T V Tl\aTcuea>v ic6\iv, ipeiyovrts
Se airiKviovTcu M rb 'Hpalov. The repetition
(<pevyov—<peiyovres seems designed to give the
impression of panic-stricken retreat. 'A*IK6-
fievoi 8e ticvTo irpb TOW ipov T& Sv\a. Kal ol
fief vepl rb 'Hpatov iffTpa.TOTctb'e&ovTO K.T.K.
Apparently the town of Plataiai is not ap-
proached more nearly than is indicated by the
place of the temple. Of course only a small
fraction of the centre could have been accommo-
dated within the town: the point is that so far
as we can see not a man betakes himself thither.
4
 See the American Journ. of Arch. vol. vi.
(1890) p. 469.
B
 Yet the identification of the ' Island' is
generally made the touchstone of theories of
Plataian topography. This misconception of
the comparative value of the two points is
strikingly exemplified by Mr. Grundy, who
finds it possible to discuss the operations with-
out reference to the site of the Heraion, other
than its incidental mention in a sentence or
two on p. 17.
6
 About eight stades, or one mile, on Mr.
Grundy's map.
7
 ix. 52 : ftpeuyov rpbs T V IlAoTaieai' vix.iv...
4TT\ rb 'Hpaiov. rb 5c rtpb rrjs iri\tis iart rrjs
THE GREEKS AT PLATAIAI. 51
that they might support one another. The new post of the quondam centre,
near the Heraion under the walls of Plataiai, was well chosen in this respect,
to check any attempt on the part of the Persian cavalry to creep along the
side of the mountain and endanger the operation in which the Spartans were
about to engage.
That such was the intended function of the Greek centre appears from
its behaviour during the conflict. Herodotos tells us* that the Greek right
was already pushing the enemy off the field when news was brought (a77e\-
Xerai) to the centre at the Heraion ' that the fight had begun, and that
Pausanias was gaining the victory.' The words of Herodotos are here
significant,—not in respect of any inference that may be supposed to be
deducible therefrom as to the site of the temple, but as indicating that
Pausanias deliberately detached a member of his force for this special
service, and also that he knew exactly whither to send his messenger. Here
again Herodotos has missed the real import of the fact. The message of
Pausanias was nothing less than an urgent summons for an advance. The
sudden development of the Persian attack caused a rapid modification of the
combinations of the Greek general; and, failing support from the ' Island '
(upon which the Athenians ought long before to have taken up their position),
a message was despatched to the centre, then lying uselessly at Plataiai, to
hurry it up in reinforcement. It is in the highest degree worthy of notice
that the centre in response at once splits up into two sections. The
Corinthians and their companions marched off through the hills, while the
Megarians and the Phliasians with their comrades proceeded by way of the
plain. Now, in the second position, the Corinthians stood alongside of the
hoplites of Tegea and Sparta: the Megarians were ranged shoulder to
shoulder with the Plataians and the Athenians. It is pretty clear from this
that the two sections of the centre2 hastened to join their respective wings,—
in accordance with the orders transmitted from the commander--in-chief': it was
no pell-mell scramble to be in at a battle already decided without them.5*
With regard to the centre of the Greek line all is intelligible and free
from complications. In opposition to the received view I maintain that it is
almost entirely in connection with the left wing, i.e. the Athenians, that
difficulties arise. The Athenians were evidently hard put to it to render an
1
 ix. 69: iv Si ToiT(f T £ -yico/teVip <f>6$<p Phlious and Megara, we shall find that it
ayyiWf rai roiai &\\OKTI "EXX7jffi TOHTJ TCT07- numbered 7,300 men. The remainder of the
ptrouri irepi rh 'Hpaiov /to! airoyevonivoiai rijs centre was 11,300 strong; the numerical
lutxWt 8TI /iixv « yiyovc /col vitcycv 01 p-trb. strength of the central sections thus bearing an
nouiroi'fecii K.T.\. appropriate relation to the strength of the
2
 And, again, these sections correspond in respective wings. The two sections also con-
strength to the wings. The right wing (Lake- tain a nearly equal number of contingents. I
daimonians and Tegeans) = ll,500. The left think that the mention of the Phliasians is
wing (Athenians and Plataians) = 8,600. The really meant to indicate the point of cleavage of
united contingents of the centre numbered the centre, as above suggested.
18,600. If we take the expression in ix. 69 : 01 3 As it is represented in ix. 69 : ol Si cwoi-
afitpl M€yapeas re iced QKtafflovs to give the two ffavrts ravra ovSeya K6<X\IOV TO,X64VT*S K.T.A.
extremes of that section, and thus to include Lower down, the Thebans espy the Megarians
the contingents standing between those of iireiyoixevovs ol/Scva xifffiov.
E 2
52 W. J. WOODHOUSE.
explanation of their action during the retirement to the ' Island.' It is in
vain that with malice prepense meaningless prominence is given to their own
march through the plain, while the Spartans fell back through the hills.1
Meaningless, for this reason : given the position and the objective point of the
wings, no other route than that which is so invidiously described byHerodotos
is possible. The map furnishes the unanswerable proof of the disingenuous-
ness of the narrative. The historian tries to fasten upon the centre the
imputation of deliberate betrayal of the wings; 2 but what of the Athenian
disobedience to orders ? For the Athenians also never reached the ' Island.'
Could anything be more transparently false than the reason assigned by the
Athenians themselves for their breach of discipline,—' knowing that it was
the Spartan temper to say one thing and do another, they remained quiet at
their post' ?3 Although Pausanias had issued the order for the troops to
fall back, an order which he knew had already been obeyed by the centre, one
which he had a right to believe was likewise respected by the left wing, we
are asked to allow that it was possible for him to remain in position unsup-
ported, for no other reason apparently than to delude the Athenians at the
cost of his own destruction and the ruin of Greece. The Spartan king
appears in the Athenian tradition as a simple farceur. Amid all the contra-
dictions in which the narrative of the campaign abounds no sentence is so
preposterous; none exhibits in a more baleful aspect the inherent vice of the
Athenians. The lie is inserted in order to conceal their own failure to gain
the rendezvous appointed by the council of generals,—a council in the
deliberations of which Aristeides the Just had a voice. It was necessary in
479 B.C., and still is necessary, to ask how it came about that the right wing
found itself without supports when the attack opened against it.
The root of the distorted version of the retirement of the army to its
third position is the malicious persistence of the Athenians in depicting the
movement as a flight instigated by the Spartans. Hence they were at pains to
minimize their own share in it, oblivious of the fact that in avoiding this
feigned Scylla they fall into the more terrible Charybdis of confessed
disloyalty and insubordination.
The desperate efforts of the Athenians to represent their conduct as
magnanimous would be amusing were it not that their tradition has won its
way to credence as sober history. The honour of the victory belonged solely
to the Tegeans and the Spartans. It was a bitter pill to swallow, but Hellas
could not be befooled on so patent a fact: all knew that the Athenian hoplites
had not contributed a single blow to the overthrow of the Persian infantry in
1
 ix. 56 : S Tlavaaviiis . . . 0x7)7* Sick rZv in the fictitious message from Pausanias, ix. 60.
KoXwv&v robs Aonrovs trivras . . . 'AOqiwoi Se 3 ix. 54 : 'A9r)vaioi Se litoleuv roiiSe- elxov
raxSevres rfiaav Tct %/j.ita.Aiv % AaxeSat^vtoi. 01 arpepas a (peas avrovs Xva 4rix6i)<rav, tourrS.iA.evm
fiev yap rS>v re 6xia>r avreixovro KBX TTJS vnwpcris TO AaxeSai/ioytav <ppovfi/j.a.Ta a>s &\\a <ppoire6vrav
TOG KtOaipuvos, <pof3t6/J.f:VOL T V ITMOV, 'ASrivaioi «a! &\Aa \eyivrav. as Se eViWjflj) rb <rrpar6-
Se KOVOI rpacpdevTcs es ri ireitov. ireSoy, (ire/iirov aipeuiv nrirea bity6it,et>6v re el
2
 ix. 52 : 4v8avra iepBevres 01 jro\A.ol oiroA.- iroj>€iW9ai eVixeipf'oiev 01 XiraprtTJrai, fire xai rb
K&oaovro, is /lev rbv %5>pov 4s rbv evveKcero OVK irapdirav fi)) Siavoevvrcu airaAAaacreadai, Intipta-
iv v6if Ixovres K.T.A. Cf. the expressions used Sal re Uavaavi-qv rb xpd>" rfi irotieiv.
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the decisive struggle. The efforts of the Athenians were perforce confined to
accounting for the damaging fact and turning it to the national honour. The
Theban attack at the head of the second Persian columnx came in here very
opportunely to prevent their carrying aid to the Spartans, who were beset in
spite of their pusillanimous concern to be secure. What, however, is the
value of the text of the Spartan message which bulks so largely in the
narrative ? There is an evident anxiety to magnify the Athenian arms on
this day:2 yet their victory over the Thebans is not so decisive as to drive
their cavalry from the field.3
From what I have written, my conception of the plan adopted in the
council of generals4 is easily gathered. The Greek force was instructed
to retire by brigades,—the centre to the Heraion, covering Plataiai and the
' Island,' the Athenians to the ' Island' itself. These two divisions were
designed to support the crucial element of the entire movement, viz. the
Spartan advance to the relief of the convoys beset in Mount Kithairon. To
the right wing, composed as it was of the flower of the army, this difficult and
dangerous task was appropriately committed. In the new position, the old
central brigade would form the extreme left, under the shelter afforded by the
Heraion and the fortifications of the town: on the other hand, the troops of
the new centre, being nearest to the Spartans, might anticipate heavy calls
upon their alacrity and courage, so that they were judiciously composed of
Athenians. As in the second position, so in the third Pausanias made the
best possible distribution of his forces. The Spartans themselves were
designed from the first to advance straight from their old position, near the
Spring Gargaphia, to the pass. The locality in which the final encounter
took place proves this, for it lies off the line that must have been followed by
troops falling back directly upon the ' Island.'
What, then, caused the break-down of this scheme ? To this question
Herodotos has a ready answer. The obstinacy of the Spartan captain who
refused to withdraw from his post was the prime cause of the collapse of the
plan. His ill-timed punctiliousness broke the Greek force into its component
brigades, which at the moment of contact with the enemy found themselves
sundered by no inconsiderable intervals. The different units had all but lost
touch of one another when the Persian squadrons held the Spartan division
fast for the attack of their supporting column.
1
 ix. 61 : oi 'htSrivaioi . . . apptaro fru6Uu> in a previous chapter (ix. 40 end) to prepare for
leal Tci /lAKurrn ivayiiveiv. Kal <rtpi 4J5T) tTTelxovo-i this by magnifying the courage of the Thebans
tiriTiSeirtu oi avriTax9tvres 'EA\i)vm>. . . Hare in leading the cavalry charges. When the
/BTjKtTi Hivaadai 0m6rj(rar T)> yitp Ttpo(TKfiner6v Athenians co-operate in the assault on the fort
tripeas i\ivee. (ix. 70) O8TO> 5J) itrxvph eyivero Teixo/iaxi'j) KO!
2
 ix. 67 : BOIWTOI 'A9ijva(oi<ri ifiaxetravro X9^vov «*' troh\6v.
Xpivov firl oruxviv. oi yap jMjSffoi'Tej rav 3 Which cuts to pieces the Megarians and
@v$alav, ovroi tlxov *po0v/iiriv QVK bxiyriv Phliasians on their march to the scene of action,
ixax^coi T€ Kal ova IBcKoKaKfovres, OSTW S<TT6 ix. 69.
Tpir)K6atoi aiirSiv oi lrpuroi Ka\ iptirroi ivBavra * ix. 50 : ol T£>V 'EWfaa* tTTparriyot . . .
tirtoov vw"A0rivaiav. Herodotos has taken care <rvvt\4x0v<rav • . • «»pa navffavlriv K.T.A.
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The story about Amompharetos is perhaps one of the most difficult points
in the narrative of the operations preceding the battle. We may,—and this
is the least satisfactory course,—accept the story, and compare the attitude of
Amompharetos with the refusal of the polemarchs Hipponoidas and Aristokles
to execute a tactical movement at the battle of Mantineia on the orders of
king Agis.1 Or has Herodotos here incorporated a regimental tradition of the
Pitanates, one derived from his Pitanate friend Archias2 ? I prefer to
account for the origin of the story in the following manner.
The Spartans did not evacuate their position without taking the
precautions demanded by the situation. Amompharetos and his Lochos were
detached to occupy the crest of the ridge which concealed the Spartan
lines: on the ridge stood the monument of Androkrates. The object of
this was twofold,—to observe the Persian cavalry, which would soon resume
its daily task of keeping in touch with the Greeks, and to retain as long* as
possible the semblance of the Greeks being in position.8 Amompharetos
stuck to his post to the last minute that it was prudent to do so, and then
rejoined the main body 'at a walk'4; the honour of a Spartan would not have
permitted a less leisurely pace. The main body had come to a halt for him
and his news a little over a mile in advance.5 His arrival just in time, with
the report that the Persians were moving, enabled the Spartans to change front
and to form for action in a favourable position on the slopes at the head of the
stream Moloeis and the Argiopian region. Amompharetos is painted by
Herodotos as an obstinate fool,6 the rival of his commanding officer in
buffoonery. On the contrary he was an officer conspicuous even among
Spartans for intrepidity, one whose tried valour gained for him the perilous
but honourable task of screening the retirement of the main body. Not
undeserved was the prize he won for bravery in the presence of the enemy,T a
prize which the Spartan purchased only with his life. Possibly there is this
amount of truth in the story of his refusal to retire, that he may have been
prominent at the council in urging the rejection of the combination which
Pausanias tried to effect. The parenthetical remark of Herodotos, that
1
 Thuo. v. 71. But there the charge had on the hill: the latter indicates that by the
Already begun, and the movement may well time Mardonios made his inspection the rear-
have been impracticable. The fact that a court guard had withdrawn, and the heights upon
martial condemned the two commanders to which the Greek sentinels had been for some
banishment proves nothing. days visible were deserted (cf. tn ri \4(ert raSi
2
 For Archias see Herod, iii. 55. We need ipiov-ns iprjiia;).
not enter here upon the vexed question of the 4 ix. 57: &.va\a&6i/Ta rbv \6xov T& twXa %yt
Pitanate regiment, the existence of which is ffdiri" *pbs rb &K\o ar'npos.
denied by Time. i. 20. s Ibid, rb Se aireABbi/ '6aov re Stita crraSia
3
 So Herodotos (ix. 58 init.) correctly dis- ape/Keye rbv '' hixoiupapi-rov \6\ov, irtpl irora/jib^
tinguishes between the report brought to Mar- Mo\6epra iSpinevov 'Apyt6irt6y re x^pov na\e6-
donios by his scouting cavalry (&s &ru0ei-o robs nevov, ry KU\ A^Tjrpos 'EAetwmV ipbv %<rrai....
"EWrivas atroix^^vovs btrb viitra) and the leal o'l re a/x<pl rbv 'Ajj.ofj.tpdpeTov irapcylvovr6 (T<pit
evidence of his own eyes (e?St TE rbv x&pov «al r) 'ITTKOS i) rwt> $ap$dpwv trpotreKftro vatra.
iprj/iov). The former refers to the discovery by 6 ix. 55 : S Se (sc. Pausanias) tiaiv6/ievov KO! OV
the cavalry of the true state of the case, not- <pperlipea icaAeW CKSIVOV.
ithstanding the presence of the Greek outpost 7 ix. 71.
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Amompharetos had not been present at that council,1 is scarcely credible in
itself and has the air of a makeshift to get round what the historian himself
felt to be an improbability.2
The retirement of the various divisions of the army cannot have been
attempted simultaneously. It was an operation of much delicacy for an army
of nearly 100,000 to fall back over hilly ground in the dark, especially if we
accept au pied de Ia4ettre the account of the demoralisation produced in the
Greek force by the incessant attacks of the cavalry.3 Not until the centre
was on the march did Pausanias give the word to his own brigade.4 The
retirement was evidently intended to take place by divisions. It was timed
to begin at the second night-watch, i.e. about midnight.5 The sum total of
the retiring centre, according to Herodotos, was about 39,000 men. The
battle was fought in the month of July-August, when day begins to break
betwen half-past four and five. A simple calculation from these data brings
us to the conclusion that the manoeuvre could not have been executed within
the time allowed. The Athenian division, deliberately or not, made the
mistake of not marching first: they were consequently delayed by the
clumsiness and unwieldiness of the centre, and the Spartans themselves were
surprised by daylight6 as they advanced towards Mount Kithairon.
The failure of the scheme must be traced to the tactical unskilfulness of
the Greek commanders. In the battles of the pre-Alexandrine age in Greece
nothing is more striking than the absence of tactics, and this in spite of the
brilliant success attending the combinations of the few tacticians who passed
meteor-like across the horizon of Hellas. In 479 B.C. it is almost too early to
speak of tactics in connection with Greek armies: their movements are still
somewhat haphazard and capricious.7 Pausanias set his officers a task beyond
their powers. They had succeeded in the advance from the first to the
second position; but in the retrograde movement, with all its complications of
direction and its nice adjustment of the divisions to the work of mutual
support in the offensive designed by the Spartan general, the commanders of
the contingents utterly failed. The army was split up into separate bodies,
1
 ix. 53 : iSAviiaCf re opewv rb iroieu^eiw, ST€ rotai AaKtSai/iovloiai.
ov irapayevifaevos r$ Trporiptf \6ycf. B ix. 51 i iirchv rrjs vvicrbs y Sevrepri (pvXaidi,
2
 The following also occurs to me,—that &s kv fi.ii ISoiaro ol Tlepaai i^op/xeoiievovs KOI
Athenian wit gave this turn to the facts in atpeas evS/ievoi -rapi.aaoi.iv ol iirir<!Tai.
order to exhibit a quasi-comic reductio ad absur- 6 ix. 56: robs 8e eirel avaKpivopivovs irpbs
dum of the boasted Spartan principle as laid ewvrovs TJ&S KareKdfifiave.
down by Demaratos, Herod, vii. 104 : ' Law 7 It is instructive to notice that it is precisely
forbids them to flee in battle, whatever the when in conflict with foreign troops that tactics
number of their foes, and requires them to and strategy are exhibited by the Greek
stand firm and either to conquer or to die.' generals, in the earlier period of Greek history.
The Athenians must have been as weary of For the whole principle governing such contests
hearing this as the Spartans themselves were was quite other than that governing the inter-
of hearing about Marathon (Thuc. i. 73). tribal wars. Hence the battles of Marathon,
3
 Eecent Greek history affords an instructive Salamis, and Plataiai stand apart in interest in
parallel. this respect. It is a difference that is not
4
 ix. 5 3 : Tlavaaviris Se dpiav atpeas ctiraA- explicable merely by reference to our fuller
\aaao/xevovs e'« TOU arparotriiov irapiiyyeWe xal knowledge of the details of the operations.
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but the rare steadiness of the men retrieved the blunders of their leaders.
Plataiai also was a 'soldiers' battle,'—one of the finest ever won by the
' Dorian spear.' *
W. J. WOODHOUSE.
NOTE A.
On the Application, of the Name Asopos in Herodotos.
Mr. Grundy (p. 18 fol.) finds in the use of the name Asopos the 'real difficulty' in the account
of the operations at Plataiai, and suggests that its solution lies in the assumption that Herodotos
used the name in two senses :—
(1) The main stream of the Asopos, called by Leake the Thespian Asopos.
(2) The stream that takes its rise in the Apotripi spring (stream A1 in Mr. Grundy's
map: cf. Leake, North. Gr. 333).
He bases his opinion upon the following arguments:—
(1) The Greek second position was defined by the Spring Gargaphia and the monument
of Androkrates, which lay in the plain 'less than three-quarters of a mile from
Plataea.' Yet, at the end of chap. 30, in speaking of the same position, Herodotos
uses the words OUTOI /itv vvv rax94vTes M T$ 'A<runr<f
(2) The expression just quoted is followed in the very next sentence (chap. 31) by the
words napr/aav, iruSo'ftei'oi TOVS "EWrivas efvat iv XlKaraiyai, KO! OUTO! M rbv 'A&ambv
riv TauTp jiioma.
From this, Mr. Grundy concludes that the reference in the first passage is to the tributary A1,
and that the addition of the words rbv TOIJTJ) piovra, ' not evidently referring directly to the
Asopus at the end of chapter 30, but to the words iv n\oToip<ri,' leaves no ' reasonable doubt that
the stream here mentioned is the main Asopus.'
In chap. 40 (/«XP' V*" 7^P To« 'AcronroG iirliurav oi fUpPapat K.T.K.) the reference is again to
the main or Thespian Asopos.
Reading further (p. 26), we find that this hypothesis of a twofold signification of the name
has apparently been prepared in order to surmount the difficulty presented by the statement in
chap 51, that the ' Is land' lay 10 stades 'from the Asopos and Gargaphia' (r) $4 iari avb TOS
'AiroiiroC (t«l TTJS Kpi\vns rrjs rapytuplrp, 4ir' § itrTparotteSfiovro T6TI, Sena ffraSlovs onrixovaa).
We must altogether reject Mr. Grundy's suggestion. The name Asopos is applied by
Herodotos consistently to the main stream, and to it enly. If Mr. Grundy is right in taking
Leake to task (p. 45) for calling the large KriekAH stream the Asopos, it is somewhat strange to
find that he himself applies the name to the insignificant brook A1 on the ground that it can be
seen from the walls of Plataiai, while the main river is invisible (p. 26).
I t is in the highest degree improbable that two distinct senses of the word should have been
so closely combined as in the two consecutive sentences quoted from chaps. 30, 31. In so far as
Mr. Grundy's hypothesis rests upon the locality to be assigned to the monument of Androkrates,
it has already been refuted. I t is also partly the outcome of a too great rigidity in the translation
of the phrase M T$> 'Affair*?- Mr. Grundy is concerned to show that the army was literally
astride the brook (p. 21). The preposition is used in its technical military sense, which would not
conflict even with the ordinary acceptation of the situation of the heroon. (Cf. chap. 38 TI(TC 8'
ixl rip 'Airanrif MapSovirp fieiu<r$u>n4vos...t0v(To: which does not mean literally on the banks.)
There is no mystery in the addition of the words rbv rairji ^iovra to the name Asopos in the
second passage. They merely indicate the change of position to another portion of the river. It
would surely have been strange to remark simply that the Persians also advanced to the Asopos,
1
 Aesch. Pers. 812 fol.
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seeing that they had been encamped on that river since the commencement of the operations (cf.
chap. 19 : (pa96v T« Sti robs Papfiipovs M T$ 'A(rarw$ (XTpaTOTreSevo/xfvovs). The words mean little
more than 'to this precise point.' Even admitting them to have some special signification, it
would surely follow from Mr. Grundy's confession that they refer to the words Iv nxoToigcri
(p. 19), that Herodotos meant thereby the stream A1, which takes its rise in the direction of
Flataiai.
When we reach chap. 40, Mr. Grnndy decides, on what criteria I know not, that the Asopos
there mentioned, is 'certainly the main or Thespian Asopus.' This, taken in conjunction with
the rest of his topography, necessitates the adoption of a theory as to three ' developments' of the
second Greek position (p. 19). It would surely have been simpler to keep to the first hypothesis,
that the Asopos upon which the Greeks lay was the stream A1, than to pile up this new hypothesis
in order after all to bring the Greeks to the main stream.
There remains the passage relative to the situation of the ' Island.' If we take the Asopos
from which the 10 stades are measured to be the main river, then the given co-ordinates (10
stades from Gargaphia, and 10 stades from Asopos) bring us to Leake's ' Island,' a position which
Mr. Grundy has shown to be impossible (p. 23 fol.). Yet£if the Spring Gargaphia is rightly
identified with the Apotripi, it becomes obvious .y impossible to argue that Herodotos measured
from the stream A1, as his starting-point in that case could only be either the source or the mouth
of the stream. The source is impossible as it coincides with the spring. The mouth is equally
impossible as that is on the line of the Thespian Asopos, which line is out of the question, as
already remarked. I suggest that K' ( = 20) has dropped out before the KOI. We should read
7) Si ivn airb TOD 'AffaiiroS K' (col rrjs Kpfyris T7JJ Tapyatylris i*' § i/rrparoirfSeiovTo TOTS Sixa OTO&IOVS
avixovara. The tract of ground identified as the ' Island by Mr. Gmndy lies almost exactly 20
stades from the Thespian Asopos.
The latest utterances of Mr. Grundy (Classical Review, April 1898, p. 161), in answer to
Mr. Frazer, simply re-affirm his views, with the additional conjecture that in the application of
the name Asopos to the stream A1 Herodotos has preserved the local custom of the Plataians !
NOTE B.
On the Chronology of the Operations at Plataiai.
The views advanced in the preceding pages necessarily involve the rejection or the modification
of the chronological items embedded in the narrative of Herodotos.
Herodotos does not tell us how long the Greeks remained in their first position, on the breast
of Mount Kithairon. We are informed, however, that the two armies had been encamped opposite
to each other already eight days before Mardonios was advised to close the pass through which the
Greeks received-their supplies (ix. 39). The pass was actually closed at nightfall of the same day.
The expression of Herodotos is ambiguous : it is not clear what is the point of departure involved in
the words rip.ipai Si tripi avTiKaTtmivouri fjSi) 4yeyiyf<ra» OKTCO. Are the eight days to be counted
from the marshalling of the troops in the second position? Such seems to be the generally
accepted view, but it has always appeared to me somewhat of a marvel that historians should
credit this reflection upon the intelligence of the Persian general. If Herodotos really meant that
the Greeks had been eight days in the second position before the pass was blocked, I should see in
the statement but one more instance of the working of national antipathy. The Greeks cannot
allow the invaders to have possessed ordinaiy common sense. Obvious as was the stroke of
blocking the main artery of the Greek communications, the tradition puts it to the credit of
Timagenidas, a renegade Theban it is true, but still a Greek (ix. 38 fol.). Mardonios, to my
mind, was more than a match for his opponents in point of military skill, and an explanation
more in accordance with the probabilities of the case must be sought. The words quoted bear
reference to and date from the first day that the two armies found themselves face to face in the
first position. The pass was closed as soon as the evacuation of the lines on Mount Kithairon
threw it open to attack. The Greeks abandoned their first position within the week.
In precisely the same way must we interpret the words in chap. 41: &s $« eySexdrri iyeyiyte
avTiKaTrifitvoitri iv IUaraificri. The expression iv TlXaraiyoi simply indicates the theatre of
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operations, and does not restrict us to the second position. The eleven days in this case also are
reckoned from the opening of the campaign. Whether this was indeed the intention of Herodotos
must be left undecided.
The next note of time is given in the important words at the opening of chap. 40 : ' after this
the armies waited two more days' (/terci St TOVTO rh tpyov irepas Sio rifiepas Bttrpttyav, ovierepot
0ov\6/xeyoi n&xt* fy>£a<)- What are the two termini involved in this expression ? With regard to
the event from which the reckoning is made no doubt is possible: it is, as Herodotos says, the
closing of the pass. When we ask to what conspicuous event in the development of the drama the
two days' interval brings us, the reply is vague and unsatisfactory. For they are followed by the
resolution of Mardonios to end this idle delay; and yet two days more intervene before his purpose
is accidentally accomplished. As it stands, the sentence is meaningless. It becomes intelligible
only upon the view already developed.
The eleventh day is devoted to the consultation of his Staff by Mardonios (ix. 41).
Alexander's visit to the Greek outposts takes place at midnight (ix. 44). On the twelfth day occur
the challenge of Mardonios, and the cavalry attacks which culminate in the loss of the Spring
Gargaphia: the Greek generals determine to fall back upon the ' Island' (ix. 48 fol.). During the
night the army evacuates the second position (ix. 52 fol.). In the early morning of the thirteenth
day the final battle is fought (ix. 56 fol.).
Now we have already seen that we must cut out as fictitious items the consultation, the visit,
the challenge, and perhaps also the loss of the spring,—that is to say, the whole of the matter
allotted to the eleventh and twelfth days, with the exception of the deliberation of the Greek
generals. The evacuation of the second position and the final struggle must therefore be
antedated by two days, and be assigned to the night of the tenth day and the morning of the
eleventh day respectively. In other words, the event to which the reckoning is made in the
sentence quoted from chap. 40 (' after this the armies waited two more days') is the final battle
itself, which took place two days after the closing of the pass of Dryoskephalai.
The story, as given by Herodotos, imperatively requires a somewhat protracted stay in the
second position on the part of the Greeks. It was also clearly impossible, from their very nature,
that the interpolated episodes of the consultation, the challenge, etc. should immediately follow
the adoption of that position. Herodotos has consequently duplicated the interval between
the closing of the pass and the final battle. He may perhaps be acquitted of the mistake
already pointed out, by which a further addition of eight days is made to the time spent in the
second position.
My idea is that when their offensive failed the Greeks at once retired, i.e. at midnight of the
tenth day, reckoning from their first appearance on the northern slopes of Mount Kithairon. They
were not more than three days in the second position.
Hence my diary of the operations is as follows:—
DAY
1 Greeks take up First Position.
2
Q
^ Attacks by Persian Cavalry,
g Death of Masistios.
6,
7 [Evacuation of First Position probably on night of this day.]
8 Greeks in Second Position.
[Pass closed on night of this day.]
9 Continued Skirmishing. Plataiai-Thebes road blocked by Persians.
10 Meeting of Greek Generals.
[Retirement to ' Island' partially effected on night of this day.]
11 Final Battle.
12-20 Burial of Dead. Collection of Spoil. Consultation.
21 Greeks march on Thebes.
The usual scheme gives in addition:—
(1) An unknown number of days in the first position.
(2) Bight days in second position before the closing of the pass.
(3) Two days of purposeless waiting after the closing of the pass.
(4) Two days devoted to Persian Council, the Challenge, and blocking of the spring.
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The result of the usual scheme is that the battle was fought on the thirteenth day after the
occupation of the second position, and Thebes is reached on the twenty-third day after the same
event. If the same generous measure is used in meting out the time spent in the first position,
the Greeks must have been four or five weeks on the Asopos. Could a force of one hundred
thousand men have kept the field for that length of time in the fifth century B.C? The case is
very different from that of a blockade, in which one side has an absolute superiority. Lastly, how
explain on the ordinary theory the arrival of the Mantineians and Eleans too late to take part in
the battle (ix. 77) ? An explanation cannot be found in the closing of the passes, as one at least
remained open to the end : nor, if such had been the reason, would the leaders of those contingents
have been banished for failure to arrive in time. On the view here presented, ten days covered
the whole series of operations previous to the final catastrophe; and the two Peloponnesian
contingents may well have found that events before Plataiai outstripped their progress to the seat
of war.
W. J. W.
